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GOVERNMENT CREDITS, DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF DEPOSITS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF BANKING: A THEORY AND TEST
I.

Introduct ion
One of the important features of banking in LDCs is the heavy

-dependen ce on sources of funds other than private deposits such as
governmen t credits, foreign borrowing s, and bank equity.

In other

words, deposit banking is still underdeve loped in many LDCs.

Govern-

ment credits to banking (hereafte r called G) consist of governmen t deposits,
governmen t and central bank loans to commercia l banks and bank notes issued
by commerci al banks; bank note issue was particula rly important for banking
in early modern Japan.

While an initial supply of sizable amount of G

is undoubted ly effective in promoting the initiatio n of banking business
through providing initial loanable funds, making the new business of
banking profitabl e and, possibly, enhancing the reliabili ty of banks,
the continuin g supply of G after the establishm ent of banks is detri
mental to the developme nt of banking since G retards the effort of
banks to extend private deposits.

The purpose of this paper is to

show that an effective way of bringing about deposit banking is to
decrease the governmen t credits to the banking sector under the condi

tion of free interest rates on deposits.
The average share of private deposits in total bank liabiliti es
;1:

This paper is part of a joint study with Hugh Patrick on finance and
economic developme nt. The author is grateful for corranents from William
Brainard, William Keeton, Hugh Patrick and Kazuo Sato. The research
assistanc e by Kazumi Asako is also gratefull y acknowled ged. Of course,
the remaining shortcomi ngs are solely his responsib ility.

-2of 42 1 LDCs is 67.4%, and
the shares of government credits, foreign liabilities and bank equity
are 14.1%, 8.3% and 9.9% respectivel y.

While the distribution of

shares of bank equity is concentrate d around the 10% level (ranging
from 4.3% to 17.6%), that of government credit is widely dispersed
from zero to 50.7%, with banking systems in 12 countries having ratios
greater than 20% and 20 countries less than 10%.

A similar wide dis

persion exists for the shares of foreign liabilities .

Consequentl y,

the shares of private deposits in total bank liabilities are also
widely dispersed, from 31.7% to 95.2%.

It is interesting to note that

a similar low dependence on private deposits characterize d early banking in Japan. 2

The shares of private deposits, government credits

and bank equity were respectivel y 12.1%, 41.4% and 46.5% in 1878-82,

27.2%, 28.5% and 44.3% in 1888-92 and 67.9%, 5.6%, 26.5% in 1908-12.
The importance of deposit banking is well-known.

There are good

reasons why an expansion of banking operations with low dependence on
private deposits does not necessarily have very favorable effects on
economic development .

One possible reasoning is as follows.

Assume a simple world of currency, deposits, bank equity, govern
ment credit to.banking, and industrial capital equity.

With a constant

currency supply, an expansion of banking operations lowers the required

1In IMF
Internation al Financial Statistics,

data on capital
accounts of the commercial banking systems are available for 55 developing countries, among which 42 countries are selected which have such
data as GNP and GDCF for the sake of convenience of future study. nata
are for 1971. Extended data coverin2 a wider range of years are under preparation .

2see Teranishi
and Patrick [1978].
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rate of return on investment activity, and thereby encourages economic
development, whenever it causes a shift of the aggregate demand function of capital equity against currency. 1

The shift depends both on

the allocation of borrowed funds by the debtors of banks and on the
method of financing by the creditors of banks. 2

For the sake of

simplicity, let us assume that the debtors do not bold currency and
allocate all their bank borrowings into real investment.

Then, the

shift of the aggregate capital demand function depends solely on the
method of financing bank liabilities.

If bank expansion is financed

by an increase in bank equity, it is more likely that bank equity
holders have bought bank equity by selling their holdings of equity
capital of other industries rather than by reducing currency holdings
because bank equity is a closer substitute to industrial equities
than to currency.

In this case, there would be no shift of the

aggreg~te capital demand function, and bank expansion would not have
any (favorable) effects on economic activity.
When bank expansion is financed by government credits, the situation would be more or lees the same because government would be holding
the least amount of idle balances, and would finance its credit to
banking by reducing investment in other areas unless it creates additional

1 For this type
of theorizing, see Tobin and Brainard [1963].

In
this paragraph, all capital equities other than bank equity are assumed
- to be homogeneous, and the possibility of higher efficiency in fund
allocation by banks relative to individual asset holders (such as scale
economy in management etc.) is neglected.
2

fhis ignores reserve currency at banks.

-4currency. 1

If, however, the expansion of banking is financed by an

increase in private deposits, the deposit increase would most likely
be financed by a decrease in currency holding; i.e. from the closest
substitute to deposits.

In this case, bank expansion would cause a

definite increase in the aggregate demand for capital and encourage
economic development .
Thus, an expansion of banking has a net favorite effect on capital
accumulatio n only when it is financed through an in.crease in the share
of private deposits.

In other words, only through deposit growth can

banks play an expansionar y role in financial intermediat ion.

How,

then, can the share of deposits in bank liabilities be increased?
Since this question is related to broad questions 6f the modernizati on
of economy as well as various banking and monetary policies, one can
conceive of a wide range of interrelate d policy measures.

Indeed, it

is quite true that a monetary reform as a banking policy should be
specified for each specific phase of development (Ranis [1977])and for
each specific country (Cameron (1967]).
In this paper, however~ we confi~e ourselves to the more basic
questions concerning the equilibrium of the deposit market.

Concretely,

· two formal questions are investigate d: (1) the effect of an autonomous
shift of the demand function or supply function for deposits and (2) the
effect of a policy-induc ed shift of the supply function for deposits.

½he currency supply has been assumed to be fixed, however. And
any expansion of currency could alternative ly be used to finance direct
government investment. The monetary policy effect of government credits
is analyzed in the next section.
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The autonomous shift of the demand or supply functions of de
posits cerresponds to the so-called promotion of the banking habit and
the increase in the efficiency of banking operations.

While these

shifts can be brought about by a number of measures such as education,
advertising, changes in availability of banks and branch offices,
inspection and guidance of banking operations, and improvement in the
communications and transportation systems, we will not consider these
in detail, and shall take the shifts as exogenously given, focussing
our analysis on the effects of these shifts.
On

the other hand, some government policies such as taxes and

subsidies, regulation of bank equity, and manipulation of government
credits to banks have more direct and definite effects.

In view of

the high reliance on government credits by banks in many LDCs, the
control of G is very important and, as will be shown below, has
definite effects on deposit market equilibrium.
In the next section, we present a simple static theoretical
analysis of these two questions.

Results of comparative statics are

evaluated by t-wo criteria; effects on the private deposits-net worth
ratio and on the required rate of return on investment.

The first criterion

is adopted on the premise that deposit banking per se is desirable in providing
an efficient payment system as well as in enabling a more ample supply of
short-term credit.

The second criterion is necessary because even if some policy

1s effective in encouraging deposit banking, its desirability should be discounted
if it is incompatible with real development.

The main conclusions

reached are as follows. (1) An autonomous increase in the efficiency
of bank operations as represented by a reduction in the cost of banking
is effective in bringing about deposit banking and also lowers the
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required rate of return on investment, encouraging capital accumula
tion.

(2) An autonomous development of the banking habit as repre

sented by a shift from currency to deposits in assets holders port
folio lowers the required rate of return on investment, but the effect
on deposit banking is indefinite, and it ia theoretical ly

possible

that the equilibrium deposit is reduced as a result of an increase in
the banking habit.

(3)

The policy of reducing G supply accompanied

by government open-market purchase of securities is effective both
in promoting deposit banking and in lowering the required rate of
return on investment.

(4)

The policy of reducing G supply accompanied

by a decrease in currency supply raises the required rate of return on
investment, but promote deposit banking insofar as the substitutio n
effect of deposit and Gin the subjective equilibrium of banks is
sufficientl y large.
Section III presents an empirical analysis of G policy with respect
to the assets market in early modern Japan.

Demand and supply functions

of deposits as well as the demand function for currency are successfn11y eArim~r~n; and the coefficient of G is show-n to be significant

with the correct sign.

This is strong support for our recommendat ion

of G reduction policy.

Finally, section IV provides some discussion

of the policy issues regarding deposit banking in LDCs with particular
attention to the relevance of G policy.

-7-

II.

Theory
1.

Model

Our model is in the DlOde of the general equilibrium model of assets
markets developed in Tobin and Brainard [1963] and Tobin [1969].

It

consists of four sectors-gov ernment (including the central bank),
(coJIDDercial) banks, individual asset holders and corporate (non-bank)
firms--and the following four financial instruments .
(i)

(ii)

Currency, comprised of government currency C
and bank notes issued by commercial banks G •
1
Securities issued by firms, banks and the govern
ment and held by asset holders, banks and the
government.

The amounts of securities issued

by firms, banks and the government are E,
and aE respectivel y.
constants and
securities.

8E

E, a and 6 are positive

aE represents the net issue of
All the securities are assumed to

be perfect substituteg with ~ach other.

(iii)
(iv)

Deposits sueplied by banks and held by asset holders.
denoted by DS and demand by fid.
G, consisting of G and G • G , as defined
1
2
1
above, comprises one part of currency; its share
in total G was important in banking in early
Meiji Japan.

G represents central bank credits
2

to banks plus eovernment deposits in banks.

Supply is

-8-

Rates of interest on Gare assumed to be zero. 1
The balance sheet of each sector is shown in Table 1.

K is the

capital stock, and p and pq represent the commodity price and the
mark.et price of existing capital goods respectively.
constant.

Both Kand pare

The rate of interest on securities is defined by the

following formula:
r •

.E.e!

(1)

QE

where Q denotes the price of securities and

p represents the physical

marginal product of capital, so that r is equal to the marginal value
product divided by the market value of securities issued by firms.

This

interest rate is the required rate of return of investment in our model.
A

fall (rise) in r encourages (discourages) capital accumulation.
Demand functions for assets of asset holders are assumed to be

linear homogeneous in net worth, and also the gross substitutabilit y
among assets is assumed.
QEh

-

~~ 0

(2)

0, Dd). > 0

(3)

Cd < 0, Cd >< 0
).
i

(4)

-d
D • Dd (r, i, ).) W; Dd < 0, Dd
i

r

=<i
d
C • C (r, i, >.) W; Cd <
r

1Analytically,

o,

H(r, i, >.) W; H > O, Hi<
r

o,

I\

>

coIIIIlercial bank note issue is nothing more than
government credit with a zero interest rate. Typically, interest is
not paid on government deposits. Central bank credits are usually
supplied at a relatively low rate which can be regarded as zero for
the sake of simplicity since its supply is determined through ration
ing.
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TABLE 1

Government
Net deficit

C (government

G2 (government de
posits and central
bank credits)

aQE (net outstanding

currency)

securities)

Commercial Banks

QEb (demand for

G (bank note issue)
1

securities)

G (government deposits and
2 central
bank credits)
Ds (supply of deposits)

BQE (bank equity)

Asset Holders.

QE h (demand for securities)

nu

W (net worth)

.l

-d

C

(demand for deposits)
(demand for currency)

Firms
pqK (capital stock)

QE (outstanding securities)
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and

(5)

i is the rate of interest on deposits.

An increase in shift parameter

A means the autonomous development of the banking habit. 1

Since the

concept of the banking habit is usually concerned with the substitution
between currency and deposits, a more specific assumption about the sign
of partial derivatives can be used where necessary.
(6)

It is assumed that the deposit market and assets investments
market faced by banks are imperfect, so that marginal costs of de
posits rises as the amount of deposits increases for a given size of
the economy increases and likewise for the marginal return on assets

investments.

Thus the maximization problem for banks can be written as

b pK, e) - -2
maximize n • rQE b _ iDS _ -cl (QE,
C (-s
D, pK, e )
subject to

QEb • G + G + Ds + SQE
2
1

where Il is profit, and

c1

and

c2 denote

the administrative costs of

assets investments and the deposits respectively.
1 rn

9

is a shift para-

his careful and extensive discussion, Porter [1966] uses a
broader definition of the banking habit which is close to the concept
of deposit banking in our terminology.
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meter of the cost functions which represents the efficiency of banking
operations.

Dividing by pK, the problem is. rewritten as

maximize Il/pK • rm - id subject to

c1

m• g + g + d +
1
2

(1, 0) -

c2

(d, 0)

%
B

where

and

c1 and c2 are assumed

Ds and pK respectively.

to be linear homogeneous in QEb and pK, and
It is also assumed that

and that g and g are constant.
2
1
Two

comments should be added on the role of pK (the current value

of capital stock) in this formulation.

In the first place, pK works

as a scale

While it is

undeniable that costs should be dependent on some scale index, the
choice of the index is an empirical question and there is not particu
larly firm ground for using

pK

as the index.

Net worth is another

possible choice, and the empirical analysis in Section 3 yields good
results by using net worth instead of pK.

In the second place, the

policy variables G and G are assumed to be proportional to pK.
1
2
is also a question to be examined empirically.

This

Total bank assets QEb
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or bank equity

.
1
QE are other candidates.

The first order condition for the maximization is given as

cm1 - cd2

r - i -

•

o

Differentiating this and the balance sheet constraint, we have
od
-ar

od

fi

- am - am ar

H

mm

1
od
< r - as

-aode

- ae

am

-

I J

>

o

-1/J < 0

-l <
od
- o(gl + g2)
- -

!_)
2
r

(1 + Cl

-

-cl l
mm r

1

1
•Cmm I J

/ J

• < -cme -

t::

0,

~

2
0, 1> 0 ell
•
Cd/J
(gl+g2)

1
r

> !!.
- as

- !.r

2
Cdd

~

0

I J > o

2
cd0) 1 J > 0

Therefore, we can write the deposit supply function 2 as

-.

D
pK

d = -

(7)

1while such a G variable as government deposits is sometimes sup
plied preferentially to large banks, this does not necessarily mean that
QEb or 8QE is used as the policy index for the aggregate supply of govern
ment deposits.

2

In most modern economies, the deposit rate is set by regulation
at a lower rate than the competitive equilibrium level, so that the
equilibrium amount of deposits is simply equal to the demand for deposits
at the regulated rate. In such a situation, there is no use for the
notion of the deposit supply function. However, when private banks
can set the deposit rate, the concept of the deposit supply function
is very important. A few examples which explicitly introduce the
deposit supply function are J. Tobin [1969], D. H. Pyle [1971] and M.A.
Klein [1971]. Incidentally, in Tobin's model there is no scale factor
for the deposit supply function (the total deposit supply is simply a
function of. interest rates), which means any two economies with the
same interest rates have the same deposit supplies irrespective of the
size of the economies.
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D• > 0 Ds
r
' i

<

O, -1

<
-

Ds •
g

ans
a(g1+g2 )

----_<

0, D2 > 0

e

- _! < D8 _< 0
r - e
and the bank demand function for securities as
(8)

m

One important feature of these derived functions is the substitution
of g and g with deposit supply.
2
1

1

When g

1

or g

2

is increased it is

partly offset by a decrease in deposit supply; consequently the demand
for security investments increases less than proportionately.

It is

also important to note that this substitution effect depends on the
relative degree of imperfection of the deposit and asset investments
market.

If c!d • 0, that is if the deposit market is perfect, 2 then

in the absolute value.

If, on the other hand, the assets investments

1
market is perfect (Cmm• O), then the entire adjustment to a change in

G occurs in bank securities holdings, since

1

There is also substitutability between deposit supply and bank
· equity, for l!hich the analysis is similar.
2

The intuitive meaning of this is simple. Because banks can obtain as much funds as they want at constant marginal cost if the de
posit market is perfect, a decrease in G is simply substituted for
an increase in deposit supply.

-14-

In other words, the substitution effect is larger the more perfect the
deposit market (holding the degree of imperfection in the asset invest
ment market constant).
Let us describe the market equilibrium.

The equilibrium condition

for the currency market is given by

C+

G
1

• Cd (r, 1, A) W

(9)

That for the deposit market is
s

D (r, 1, g

1

+ g 2 , 0,

d

8) pK • D (r, 1, A) W

(10)

and for the security market

(1 +a+

8) QE = H (r, i, A) W

+ Ds (r, i, g + g , e,
2
1

(11)

8) pK

+ Gl + G2 + 8 QE
By using (9) ,. . __ (11) and the balance sheet constraint of the banking
sector, net worth is written as

w

a) QE

ii

+ C - G2

(12)

Dividing by pK, our model becomes the following two equations
(13)

(14)
d

• D

where c •

C

pK

(r, i,

A) { (1

+

The equation for the security market is excluded by
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Walras' Law, and the commodity market is neglected following the con
vention of Tobin-type assets market analysis.
Effects of Autonomous Changes in Banking Efficiency and

2.

the Banking Habit

e.

Let us examine the effects of an increase in

This can be re

garded as a formal representation of the autonomous improvement in the
We have

efficiency of banking operations.

--- ar *

1

30

A

0

Ds

e

--- 3i

*

ae

Al2
A22

All

1

A

< 0

A21

0

Ds

> 0

e

and, with respect to the ratio of private deposits to net worth,
dD*d

--

d0

*d
r

• D

ar * + n*d
ae
i

lL*
ae

>

o

where
All•

c! {(l + ~) f +

c - g .} - Cd (1 +

2

A

= Cd {(l +a)£+ c - g } < 0

A

• Dd

12

i

r

21

•

<

0

r

2

r

8
{(1 +a).£.+ c - g2} - Dd(l + a) .e.2 - Dr < 0
r
r

and
A

~) ~

< 0
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The implica tions of these results are obvious .

An

increase in 0 causes

a rightwa rd shift of the deposit supply function , yielding a higher
interes t rate on deposit s.
increase d.

Demand for securiti es by banks is also

Although demand for securiti es by asset holders is decrease d

by the higher deposit interest rate,.th is decrease is numeric ally
smaller than the increase in the demand by banks.
rate of return on investme nt r is lowered.
r causes the equilibr ium
An

Thus, the required

A rise in i and a fall in

deposits to increase .

improvement of the banking habit is formally represen ted by

an increase in

).

ar * 1
---n
A

.

The results are

+Cd { (1 + a) -I) +
).
r

C -

g2}

~2

-Dd { (1 + a) -p +
).
r

C -

g2}

A22

a* 1
---a>.
A

All

-Cd { (1 + a) £. +
).
r

C

- g2 }

A21

-Dd { (1 + a) -p +
).
r

C

- &2 }

By applying assumpt ion (6), these become1

"or *
a>. ""
ai *
a).

-

-c~A
A

t ,,
\ \.I.

__ '\

r:J.)

&2 'J

('½_2 + A22) < 0

+

a) -+c - g }

(All+ A21) < 0

-Cd

).

A

(1

p

•
T

-+
r

C -

p

r

2

and also

--t.XD

a).

*d

0
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The second term on the right hand side of this equation is negative.
Thus, in this case, an increase in the banking habit does not neces
sarily assure an increase in the equilibrium share of deposits.

In

terms of Figure 1, both the CC curve representing currency market
equilibrium and the DD curve representing deposit market equilibrium
shift leftward.

By the property given in footnote 7 and assumption

6, the shift of the CC curve is greater than that of the DD curve, so
that both rand i decrease.

In the deposit market equilibrium de

picted in Figure 2, the deposit demand function shifts rightward
directly due to an increase in A and indirectly due to a fall in r,
while the deposit supply curve shifts leftward due to a fall in r.
Therefore, when the interest elasticity of the deposit function is
large or deposit supply is highly elastic to a change in r, it is
possible that the equilibrium amount of deposits is decreased as a
result of an increase in the deposit habit as stipulated in (6).
However, it must be noted that the reality of this paradoxical
result is somewhat questionable.

In a financially underdeveloped

economy where a mere increase in knowledge of the availability of
deposits induces a shift from currency to deposits in people's port
folio, the interest elasticity of holding deposits is considered to
be small.

In other words, the degree of portfolio shift of this kind

does not change with the level of deposit interest rates.

It can be

said that in an economy where A can be significantly changed, the
interest elasticity of deposit demand is usually small, so that a pol
icy of increasing A will be effective in promoting deposit banking.

-18-

Figure

1
D'

r

D

C'

C

D

i

Figure 2

i

~

demand for deposi ts

;.upply of deposits
deposi t
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3.

Effects of G Policy

In our model, there are two kinds of G, of which G1 is itself a
part of currency and the value of G is constrained by the balance
2

sheet of the government.

Therefore, in the analysis of G policy,

it is necessary to stipulate the way by which G is changed.

We will

examine the following two cases: (1) G policy with variable currency
supply and (2) G policy with variable security supply.

1

Although

there are two components of G, the policy of changing G2 and, at the
2 Therefore,
same time, changing C in the same amount and direction.
it is sufficient to analyse only the effect of G1 manipulation.

(1)

dG

(or equivalently dG

1

2

• dC)

This policy assumes a change in currency supply accompanied by G policy.
By setting dg

1

in equations (13) and (14), we obtain

--

1

A

a)£.+ c - g) - Ds} < 0
i
2
r

3

<.O

1 Changing G with variable government expenditure is another possibility.
To deal with this case, we must reformulate the model into that of period
analysis, a task left to the future.
2

In equations (9)- (11), all the changes in net worth, currency
supply, and central bank and government credits to banking are the
same under these two configurations.
s
s d
d
3
The sign of Di - DgCi follows from -1 ~ Dg ~ 0 and the gross substitution
assumption; i.e.

Dd - DsOd > Dd +Cd• -Hd > 0
i
i
i
g i
i

-20dD*d
dg

A decrease in G causes a rightward shift of the deposit supply function,
causing a rise in the deposit rate.

However, since the currency supply

is decreased in this case, the security interest rate (required rate
of return on investment is increased, 1 and the final effect on capital
accumulation is unfavorable.

Although the sign of the equilibrium

amount of deposits is ambiguous in general, it is definitely increased
by the G reduction policy if the substitution effect is numerically
large enough; that is

if and only if
> Ds

g

A1~h~1gh r

is raised by a reduction of Gin

case,

because of the decreased currency supply in this policy configuration.
It is important to note that the deposit substitution effect of G itself
has a favorable effect on capital accumulation, although its numerical
value is smaller than the effect of the currency reduction (see footnote 3,
page 19).
l

A rise in i causes a decrease in the demand for currency. However,
this decrease is not as large as the decrease in the currency supply. This
is because the gross substitution assumption requires a decrease in security
demand as irises.

-21-

dGl •-de• d(aQE) (or equivalently, dG2 • dC and d(aQE) • -dC)

(2)

In this policy, the supply of securities by the government is changed by
the

G

The currency supply is kept constant.

policy.

de• -dg

1

and

r
- dg
P 1

1

By setting

+ -a dr in equations (13) and (14), we obtain
r

~2 Ds > 0
g

A'

(1

dD*d
dgl
where

+ a)

e..r +

c - g

2

} - cd

e..r 2

8

} D <

g

o

- < 0

All+ t
A,.,

d pa
2 Al2
r
< 0

A21

+ 0d pa
r

2

A22

A decrease in G raises i by shifting the deposit supply function
(with the demand function constant), and in the currency market, the
higher i causes a fall in r since the currency supply is constant.

In

this case, the G reduction policy not only decreases the required rate

l dg

1

• d(a ~ ) • d(a £.) • - £. adr
2
r
pK
r

+ £. da
r
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of return on investmen t, but also increases the equilibriu m deposit
level.

It is also interestin g to note that all the effects are strictly

proportio nal to the value of Ds

g

8

Dg

-

(substitu tion effect).

Therefore , if

e
0

This is because the decrease in the security supply is exactly equal to
the decrease in the security demand by banks in the absence of any sub
stitution effect.

III.

Empirical Analysis of G Policy

The policy of reducing G is shown to be quite effective in bringing
about deposit banking by inducing a substitut ion for G of private de
posits.

It is important to note that the condition of a market-de termined

deposit interest rate is crucial to this analysis.

If the deposit rate

paid is regulated so as to be below its competiti ve equilibriu m level,
the equilibriu m amount of deposits would be determine d irrespect ive
of the deposit supply condition .

In other words, banks would simply

supply deposits up to the amount demanded at the ceiling interest rates
on deposits.

In that situation there would be no substitut ability

between deposit supply and G, and G could not be manipulat ed to affect
bank deposit supply; all G would simply be reflected in changes in
bank loans {and other invested assets).
The experienc e of banking in early Japan presents a typical example
of this kind of G policy.

In Japan, the modern banking system was
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established by supplying a huge amount of G initially, thereby making
it more profitable to enter the banking business.

After most of the

private banks were set up, however, the government deliberately tried
to reduce the supply of G with the more or less explicit purpose of
·promoting deposit banking.

Moreover, this G policy was done under

almost completely free market conditions; in particular, there was
virtually no regulation of interest rates. 1
Therefore, by estimating the asset demand and supply functions
for this period of Japan, we can obtain empirical counterparts of
equations (13) and (14).

Estimation is done for the period 2 1888-1913,

and the method of estimation of two-stage least squares developed by
Fair (1970] is utilized because of the strong possibility of serial
correlation in disturbance terms on account of the lagged endogenous
variables.
Our model is summarized in Table 2.
in line with our expectations.

The results are generally

In the demand for currency equation, the

signs of the coefficients for interest rates are correct and that for
deposit rate significant; 3 the wealth effect as measured is not significant,

•

while the explanatory power of the income term is strong.

In almost all

forms of estimation experimented with, we obtained better results by using
the square root of income rather than income itself •. This suggests the

1

These points are explained in detail in Teranishi and Patrick (1978].
2nata are not adequate prior to 1888, and after 1913 or so the value
of G became insignificantly small.
3

The deposit rate used here is for six-month time deposits; it should
be noted that interest was paid on most forms of demand deposits as well,
and that changes in various deposit rates moved together.
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(1)

2

Supply of Currency

-

c-c w
w
(2)

Demand for currency

i • -0.0823

- 0.0113i - 0.000lr· + 12.6689

(2.93)

(-2.86)

(-0.35)

~

(4.38)

6
+ 0.0137 ~
(0.33)

+ 0.1316 ~)-1 - 0.0092 <8>-1
(0.65)

(-0.16)

2
R • 0.990, p • - -0.326

(3)

Demand for Deposits

~

• 0.0867 + 0.0188i + 0.0014 r.
(0.76)

+ 0.6649

(1.19)

~-)_

(-0.52)
1

p -= 0.210

Suoolv of Deoosits

D'

-

w

• 0.1947 - 0.0407i + 0.0026 r
(1.02)

(-1.47)

+ 0.0209

PK
w

(1.72)

(3.02)

+ o.1965

D'
<w>_
1

. (3. 71)

2
R • 0.658, p . o.~59

(5)

(-1.74)

(-0.76)

2
R • 0.903,

(4)

(1.39)

~)~l -0.0041

(2.82)

- 4~5972 y~ - 0.2096

Equiiibrium Condition of Deposit Market
D'

D' D

--w
DW

G

- 0.8819 L

(-1.68)

~
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2 (continu ed)

Table

Notatio ns:
Endogen ous

C/W
D/W

currency (outside banks) - wealth ratio
private deposits plus postal savings - wealth ratio

D' /w: private deposits - wealth ratio
: rate of interes t on deposits
i
r

rate of yield on securiti es (includi ng capital gains
and losses)

Exogeno us

C/w :

currency (outside bank.$) .- wealth ratio
Y½/w: (square root of) gross nationa l expendi ture (at
current prices) - wealth ratio
G/L: governm ent credit to banking - total bank funds ratio
.

.

D'/D: private deposits - privat~ deposit s plus postal
savings ratio
Bil/W: rate of change of wealth
PK/W: gross capital stock (at current prices) - wealth ratio

Note:

2
Figures in parenth esis are t values. R is adjusted for degree5
of freedom . P denotes the coeffici ent of serial correlat ion of disturba nce
terms.

Sources :

The numbers of parenthe ses indicate the· correspo nding columns

in Statisti cal Table II of Teranis hi ~nd Patrick [1978].

C(~) • (19) - (20), ~ • (2) + (3) + (19) - (7), D • (6), D! • (5) + (18),

L • (6) + (7) + (8), Y • (16), PK• (1), G • (7),
i • (11), re• {(2) x (13) + (3) x (15) }

¾
~

((2) + (3) ).
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existence of scale economy in currency use during this period, reflecting

probably the fact the monetization of the economy had already been
virtually completed by 1888 or so.

In the demand for

deposits equation, the deposit interest rate coefficient is of correct
aign and significant but for the yield on securities is not correct, while
the income effect is not significant.

The negative sign for the wealth

effect, together with its insignificance in the currency equation,
suggests a positive wealth effect on security holding.

The speed of

1
adjustment in the holding of deposits is slower than for currency demand.

In the deposit supply equation, the signs of coefficients of both
interest rates are correct although the R2 is not particularly high.
The sign of pK/W implies that an increase in W (relative to PK), due
to the increased supply of government bonds and currency as well as to
the accelerated incorporation of firms, induced banks to shift leftward
their deposit supply schedule with the objective of lowering the deposit
interest rate paid.

This suggests some increase in market power of banks

related to an increase in W.

The coefficient of G/L (L • total bank

liabilities) is significant and its value =0.88 suggests a strong sub-

stitution effect between G and Das hypothesized.

This coefficient

roughly corresponds to Ds in the theory. 2
g

1
our model in its final form does not include shift parameters
for changes in the banking habit or banking efficiency. One reason for
this is we could not find good measures for these effects. For example,
an experiment with the ratio of the number of banks to population did not
improve the results.
2

The long-run equilibrium value is -1.098. Estimations using G/pK
or G/W instead of G/L did not yield good results, so that exact comparison
with the theoretical analysis is not possible.
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Due to the inadequacy

1

of data for this early period, the results

of estimation, although fairly satisfactory, are not robust enough
to allow conditional simulation experiments of G policy.

However,

since Japan was quite successful in promoting deposit banking in this
period (the ratio of private deposits to corporate net worth rose
from 0.17 in 1888 to 0.46 in 1913) and G was reduced drastically (the
ratio of G to total bank liabilities was 0.17 in 1888 and 0.03 in 1913),
it can be conjectured there occurred a significant substitution between
G and private deposits.

IV.

Concluding Remarks

With regard to the problem of how to develop deposit banking,
we have analysed two broad questions.

Both the development of the

banking habit and of efficiency of bank operations as formally repre
sented by autonomous shifts of assets demand and supply functions are
theoretically effective

2

in fostering deposit banking.

While these

shifts are basically desirable, it is not easy to specify policy

1
One most important difficulty lies in the definition of net worth.
Since this period is characterized not only by rapid development of
deposit banking but also by the accelerated incorporation of business
firms, corporate net worth (paid-in equity and reserves, increased much
faster than the real capital stock. Since our data on net worth of assets
holders does not include the equity capital of unincorporated firms (since
data are not available), there is a possibility of significant bias in our
estimation. As Silber [1975] emphasizes, much work needs to be done on
the interaction of the development of direct financing and indirect
financing, theoretically as well as empirically.
2

Except for one paradoxical case for shifts in the demand functions
of deposits and currency.
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i

measures for this purpose and it is likely to take a long time for
the effects of policy measures to be realized.

Perhaps these shifts

should be pursued in a broader policy framework of overall modern
ization of the economy.

The policy of reducing Gunder free interest rates, on the other
hand, has a more definite result and at least is more operation al for
policy.

In view of the substanti al dependenc e on G of LDC banking,

the possibili ty of G policy should be considere d seriously .

However,

it must be noted that there are many significa nt differenc es between
the actual financial circumsta nces of LDCs and those which prevailed
in Meiji Japan and assumed in our theory.

First, for many LDCs

interest rates are far from free and put under strong regulatio ns.
Second, there are many kinds of regulatio ns on the allocatio n of
bank portfolio s, which make it necessary to treat both assets and
liabiliti es sides of bank activity in evaluatin g G policy.

Third,

foreign liabiliti es are additiona l important sources of funds for
LDC banking, and their relations hip with G and private deposits
poses another problem to be considere d.

Fourth, the degree of devel-

opment of a market economy should be taken into considera tion.

As

we have shown, G policy is relativel y more efficient in a relativel y
more developed market economy because the substitut ion of G by
deposits by banks is positivel y related to the degree of perfectio n
of the deposit market.
With all these qualifica tions, we believe that the relevance of
G policy should be considere d for each specific phase of a specific
economy's developme nt.

In our assertion for G policy, we agree with
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McKinnon [1973] in his advocacy of the utilization of market interest
rates and with Chandler [1962] in his following assault on continuing
heavy dependence on Gin LDCs. 1
•rt is one thing for a central bank to promote
the establishme nt of new financial institution s
to supervise and examine them, to help them
developing efficiency and trustworthi ness. It
is quite another to place on the central bank
heavy continuing responsibil ity for financing
these institution s. And this is the situation
in country after country' (p. 17).

1
Johnson's policy recommenda tion concerning the establishme nt
of new institution s is also similar to our G policy ([1974] p. 96).
See also Brimmer [1971], p. 785.
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